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Abstract: Global environmental protection is characterized as a public good.
In contrast to the national level where the state is able to regulate external
eﬀects, there is a lack of supranational institutions which have enough power
to force countries to reduce pollution levels. In spite of the free-riding problem
it can nevertheless be observed that countries sometimes commit themselves
to contribute to the public good ‘environmental protection’. The case of the
Kyoto protocol for global CO2 reduction demonstrates that some countries make
substantial volunatry contributions, but others do not or on a much less level.
The paper provides a game-theoretic explanation how the free-riding-problem can
be overcome to some extent by voluntary cooperative behavior. It is analysed
under which conditions free-riding countries can be motivated to make at least
small pollution reduction eﬀorts.
Keywords: global environmental policy, public good, voluntary cooperation,
bounded rationality, game theory.
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1 Introduction
In standard environmental economics pollution is characterized as an external eﬀect of
economic activity. This means that the welfare of other subjetcs is aﬀected by these
activities and that the eﬀects are not compensated via the price system. Therefore, the
price system is incomplete and leads to an ineﬃcient allocation of goods and factors
as well as to a loss of welfare. A reduction of pollution has then the characteristics
of a public good: All subjects beneﬁt from better environmental quality in a non-
rivalry way and nobody can be disclosed from the beneﬁts. On a national level the
state is an institution which has the power to control pollutive acitivities, either by
forcing the national pollutants (technological restrictions, quantitative limitations) or
by incorporating external costs into the price system (environmental taxes or tradable
pollution rights). Such policies are seen as appropriate answers to the market failure.
1Unfortunatley, many environmental problems like the emission of the greenhouse gas
CO2 are global problems. A reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is then a contribu-
tion to a global public good. Moreover, an unilateral reduction by one country will have
only marginal ecological eﬀects and henceforth little beneﬁts for the country itself while
its reduction costs are very high. Only if a critical mass of countries make substantial
pollution reduction eﬀorts there is a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. Due to the public good
property the free-riding problem arises. There is no supranational institution which
has enough power to force national governments to contribute to the public good or to
establish a global incentive compatible mechanism of pollution control. Nevertheless,
in the past many environmental contratcs between countries or at least declarations
of intent have been made. This is remarkable, since deviations from the announced
policy or violations of contracts will hardly lead to substantial sanctions. From a clas-
sical game-theoretic point of view contracts or declarations without powerful external
institutions have no suﬃcient commitment power (see e.g. B¨ ohringer/Vogt (2003) for
a critical assessment of the Kyoto protocol). But nevertheless, some of them seem to
work.
Classic game theoretic explanations for cooperation in a dilemma situation like the pub-
lic good game are not very convincing in the context of global environmental protection.
Approaches like the Folk theorem results or stratgic commitments as reputation signals
always require repeated games and/or special assumptions about asymmetric informa-
tion. In real world situations countries interact repeatedly, but each time in a diﬀerent
context with diﬀerent information conditions including scientiﬁc knowledge. Especially
there are no convincing explanations for the empirically relevant co-existence of coop-
erative and free-riding behavior. Hence, the theory of repeated games seem to be of
limited use for analysing international environmental agreements. Furthermore, there
is a lot of experimental evidence that agents do not behave according to the rational
man paradigm. In experimental public good games and bargaining games there is
robust evidence that people make substantial voluntary contributions and seem to be
guided by fairness and reciprocity norms rather than rational opportunism (cf. Led-
yard (1995), Keser (2002)). It seems to be promising to use game-theoretic concepts
on the basis of bounded rationality to explain this kind of behavior and to apply them
to the problem of international contracts about environmental protection.
2The paper ist strucured as follows: Chapter 2 brieﬂy reviews the basic game-theoretic
concepts which account for boundedly rational decision behavior. In chapter 3 the
general structure of the public good game is presented as a model for the contribu-
tion to global pollution reduction. Diﬀerent cases of games with three countries are
explicetly analyzed in chapter 4. Depending on the parametrization it is shown under
which conditions voluntary contributions – guided by reciprocity norms or by rational
imitation of reciprocity – occurs and can eventually co-exist with free-riding behavior.
Chapter 5 summerizes the results and brieﬂy discusses some policy implications.
2 A gAme-theoretic concept for bounded rationality
It is often claimed that decision behavior should no longer a priori identiﬁed with
expected utility maximizing as it is the usual notion or rationality in economics (cf.
Conlisk (1996), Selten (1990)). In a strategic context pure rational behavior can be
characterized by choosing the best response to the expected decisions of all other
players. Let Si be the strategy space of player i = 1,...,n with si ∈ Si as his strategy, let
s−i = (s1,...,si−1,si+1,...,sn) the strategy vector of all players except i, and ui(si,s−i)











is the best response map. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle (s∗
i,s∗
−i) where all
agents play he best response and where the realized and expected decisions are identical.
We generalize the approach by assuming that payoﬀ maxizing is only one possibility
to respond to the expected decisions of other players. More generally, si ∈ fi(se
−i)
describes the way how player i responds to se
−i. The function (or correspondence) fi
is called a behavioral rule and it characterizes the pattern, how decisions are made.
Such patterns emerge due to habit formation, social norms, speciﬁc cognitive concepts
etc., and they have to be deﬁned on the basis of empirical evidence. An equilibrium
requires that behavior must not depend on contrafactual expectations, and that every
player decides in full accordance with the adopted pattern of decision making fi. An







i for all i = 1,...,n (for details cf. Pasche (2001)). Such a strategy vector
3is deﬁned as a behavioral equilibrium: All players have consistent expectations and
make decisions according to their adopted behavioral pattern. It has to be noted that
the Nash equilibrium is a reﬁnement of a behavioral equilibrium where all players
adopt the best response rule fi = f∗ ∀i. Since each behavioral equilibrium depends
on the behavioral rules which governs the decision making process, the equilibrium
can also be denoted as (s∗
1(f1),...,s∗
n(fn)). This means that the distribution of rules
induces a behavioral equilibrium. However, the existence and uniqueness of such an
equilibrium is not ensured. In the present context of complete information a behavioral
equilibrium requires that the rules are Common Knowledge. The more complicated
case of uncertainty about the rule type of other players is not considered in this paper.
One main problem of modelling boundedly rational behavior is the danger of con-
sidering complete aribtrary behavioral patterns, based on arbitrary assumptions (see
Rubinstein (1998), p.4). Some of the behavioral hypotheses may have good descriptive
properties but the explanatory power can be questionable. To escape from arbitrareness
in considering rules fi it has to be explained why players only adopt certain behavioral
rules. For this reason we assume that actual decision behavior is governed by ﬁxed
rules, but that the rules themselves may change in the long run by individual learning
or some kind of adaption processes. Individual learn, how to make (good) decisions
(see, again, Rubinstein (1998), p.4). Furthermore, we assume that due to the adaption
process only those rules are adopted which have a good performance, measured by ex-
pected equilibrium payoﬀs. Good performing rules are more likely to be adopted than
poor performing ones. In the long run we then can identify rule proﬁles (f∗
1,...,f∗
n)
(implying speciﬁc behavioral equilibria, if they exist) where no player can beneﬁt from
adopting another rule. Let F be the set of all feasible rules. Then (f∗
1,...,f∗
n) is called


















−i(·)) is the induced behavioral equilibrium. This is equivalent to a
Nash equilibrium on the level of rules instead of strategies. Norms, habits or other
determinants of actual decision behavior – and even distributions of heterogeneous
determinants – are not presupposed but endogeneous outcomes of equilibrium proﬁles.
The concept of equilibrium proﬁles serves as a selection device: It identiﬁes ‘justiﬁable’
4rules among a large variety F, and it is able to derive the speciﬁc conditions under
which certain rules will be adopted and others not. A boundedly rational rule fi can
economically be justiﬁed as being a part of an equilibrium rule proﬁle. This implies
that it is not beneﬁcial for each agent to adopt another decision pattern like payoﬀ
maximization (fbr) because this would induce a diﬀerent behavioral equilibrium with
lower equilibrium payoﬀs. If an equilibrium proﬁle is interpreted as the long run out-
come of an evolutionary adaption process it is remarkable that rational maximizing
behavior generally cannot be justiﬁed as the unique dominant best performing behav-
ioral pattern, as it was argued by Alchian (1950). Moreover it can be the case that –
depending on the context – equilibrium distributions of diﬀrent rules may exist even if
agents are assumed to be identical.
3 The public good game: Volunatry contributions and free-riding
We apply the methodology of chapter 2 to a public good game. It is assumed that n
players make contributions to a public good ci ∈ [0,ai],i = 1,...,n where ai > 0 is the
status quo pollution of country i. This implies that all other n − 1 players can not
be disclosed from the beneﬁts and that there is no rivalry in ‘consuming’ the good. A
simple but appropriate payoﬀ function can be written as




with βi ∈ [ai/
P
i ai,1] as the marginal return of contribution. If βi > 1 would hold true
then there is no dilemma situation since each country would beneﬁt from its own (full)
contribution ci = ai regardless of the other player´s decisions. In case of β < ai/
P
i ai
the player would never have a positive payoﬀ even if all player make full contributions.
Without loss of generality we normalize
P
i ai = 1 so that ai ∈ [0,1]. Diﬀerent pa-
rameters ai account for the possibility that agents may have diﬀerent opportunities to
contribute. In case of global pollution reduction a large emitter of greenhouse gases is
able to make quantitatively larger contributions than a small emitter. The parameter
βi can also be country-speciﬁc. It is reasonable to argue that countries with very high
opportunity costs of emission reduction will have lower values of βi. Moreover, it is
possible that countries are diﬀerently aﬀected by the external eﬀects of pollution, e.g.
5countries may more or less suﬀer from the greenhouse eﬀect. This can also be expressed
by diﬀerent βi.
It is obvious that the solution of maximizing (1) is ci = 0 which is the dominant
strategy. This means that free-riding is the unique best response to the decisions
of other players. The Nash solution ci = 0 ∀i is Pareto inferior because all players
would beneﬁt from full contributions ci = ai ∀i. As a ﬁrst step we identify rational or
‘opportunistic’ decision making as a behavioral rule fo with
ci = f
o(c−i) = 0. (2)
In experimental games it is observed that agents are neither strictly opportunistic,
nor they are unconditional cooperative, friendly, or fair. They behave rather friendly,
cooperative and fair conditional to the (expected) behavior of other players. This phe-
nomenon can be described as a reciprocity norm. In the present case we have a multiple
agent game. We assume that reciprocity-guided agents (countries or governments) will
make positive investments in the public good according to the average (relative) contri-
butions of the other players 1/(n−1)
P
j6=i(cj/aj). A simple version of such reciprocal








implying that the contribution level equals the average contribution of all other players.
However, this simple reciprocity rule has two severe shortcomings: (a) If all players
adopt this rule there is a broad continuum of behavioral equilibria within the range
c∗
i ∈ [0,ai] with ci/ai = cj/aj∀i,j. It is an open question which equilibrium is selected.
Furthermore, each equilibrium can easily been disturbed by small (stochastic) devia-
tions because all agents would immediately respond to the deviation. (b) The presence
of only one opportunistic free-rider even in a large population of players would reduce
the equilibrium space to the unique solution ci = 0 ∀i. In case of an arbitrary small un-
certainty about the rule type of other players it is very unlikely to establish a solution
with positive contributions.
A much more robust reciprocity rule fr is obtained if a base rate of cooperation b is
introduced which is assumed to be the same for all players:









6If no player j makes a positive contribution to global pollution reduction the reci-
procity rule implies ci = b where b > 0 may be very small and must not exceeding
argmin{a1,...,an}. If all players choose cj = aj also the reciprocity rule will fully
cooperate with ci = ai.
In the following we analyze a static version of the game. To account for dynamic
aspects we will extend the opportunistic rule in the following way: If a free-riding
country wants to beneﬁt from positive contributions of other countries in the future,
it has an incentive to prevent these countries from switching to the opportunistic rule.
Even if the reciprocity norm is not binding for the opportunistic country, it has self-
interest in preserving this norm in other countries. Hence, opportunistic countries may
‘imitate’ reciprocal behavior by making (small) contributions coi which solves
min
ci∈[0,ai]
ci s.t. uj(sj,s−j) > 0 ∀j ∈ {k|fk = f
r}.
This critical contribution is at least a neccessary contition for the norm-guided players
to stay cooperative because this guarantees positive payoﬀs compared to zero payoﬀ
in a pure opportunistic scenario. This kind of behavior is called imitation rule foi and
is a variant of rational opportunistic behavior. All rules have the property that each
rule proﬁle (f1,...,fn) implies a unique behavioral equilibrium what makes the analysis
comfortable.
4 Voluntary pollution reduction: the case of three countries
4.1 Identical countries
Assume that there are n = 3 countries which are responsible for globally relevant
emissions. The governments of these countries know that a reduction of these emissions
is desireable and welfare-improving. For simplicity we normalize the reduction goal
to one and assume that each country i can commit itself to reduction contributions
which cannot exceed ai with
P
i ai = 1. The decision behavior in these countries is
characterized by a rule fi ∈ {fo,fr}. Since the countries or governments, respectively,
interact for a very long time, it can be justiiﬁed that behavioral rules are assumened














Obviously (fo,fo,fr) can never be an equilibrium proﬁle because the norm-guided
country will have negative payoﬀs ui = (βi − 1)b < 0 so that switching to the oppor-
tunistic rule is always beneﬁcial. Furthermore, with certain parametrizations, also a
fo-player may beneﬁt from switching to fr. It has to be noted that pure opportunistic
behavior (fo,fo,fo) is always an equilibrium rule proﬁle. No country can beneﬁt from
unilaterally adopting the reciprocity rule.
However, a remarkable number of cases of voluntary contributions to global environ-
mental policy can empirically be observed. This can be explained by the hypothesis
that norm-guided reciprocal behavior is beneﬁcial and that an unilateral switch to free-
riding will also harm the switching country itself. Of course the opportunistic country
would ceteris paribus have additional payoﬀs −(βi − 1)ci > 0 but since free-riding
reduces the average contribution it induces the norm-guided countries to reduce their
eﬀorts as well. To keep analysis simple we ﬁrst consider the case of three identical
countries, i.e. ai = 1/3∀i and βi = β∀i. It turns out that in case of F = {fo,fr} only
pure opportunistic or pure reciprocity behavior can be equilibrium proﬁles:
Proposition: Let F = {fo,fr} and ai = 1/3, βi = β∀i. Then (fo,fo,fo) is the







Otherwise (fo,fo,fo) and (fr,fr,fr) are both equilibrium proﬁles.
Proof: Consider the behavioral equilibria induced by (fr,fr,fr), (fr,fr,fo) and
(fr,fo,fo) by calculating the ﬁxpoint of the system ci = fi(c−i), i = 1,2,3 where
fi is either (2) or (3):
c
r
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i = b(β − 1) < 0, u
oro
i = bβ > 0.
The three upper indices denote the rules of the three players where the ﬁrst upper
index denotes the rule of the actual player. If one country adopts fo and the second
























Since the base rate b > 0 cannot exceed ai = 1/3 it follows β∗∗ ≤ β∗ ∀b (see ﬁgure
1). If β < β∗∗ the proﬁle (fr,fr,fr) is not an equilibrium because it is beneﬁcial
for one country to deviate. But also the resulting conﬁguration (fr,fr,fo) ist not an
equilibrium because β < β∗∗ implies β < β∗. Therefore, it is beneﬁcial for one of
the remaining fr-players also to switch to opportunistic rule. It is evident that the
resulting proﬁle (fr,fo,fo) is also no equilibrium. Hence, (fo,fo,fo) is the unique
equilibrium. For β > β∗∗ it is evident that (fr,fr,fr) is an additional equilibrium
proﬁle.
Corollary: If β > β∗∗ holds true the emerging equilibrium proﬁle (fr,fr,fr) can
have diﬀerent ‘basins of attraction’. Assume that β > β∗ > β∗∗. Then with (fo,fr,fr)
as well with (fo,fr,fo) it is beneﬁcial for an opportunistic player to switch to fr. In
case of β∗ > β > β∗∗ in the same rule proﬁles it is beneﬁcial for one norm-guided player
to switch to fo, and the cooperation will break down. Positive contributions to the
public good then require that all countries decide according to fr.
The static analysis provides a very limited view on the behavior of governments. It
has been argued that in the long run the behavioral patterns may change and adapt
to better performing rules. In a scenario where one or two countries are free-riders it
is easy to anticipate that – depending on β∗
i ,β∗∗





















Figure 1: Critical values for β
other countries will perform poorly. There is the danger that the norm ‘erodes’ and
all countries will behave opportunistic in the long run. There may be an incentive
for an opportunistic country to ‘simulate’ reciprocal behavior in order to sway the
norm-guided countries to keep their norms. The consideration is that the opportunistic
country waives a part of its large payoﬀs from free riding by making little contributions
to the public good. This will at least be compensated by positive payoﬀs in the future
(instead of running into a complete non-cooerative solution with zero payoﬀs). Even
if the country imitates reciprocal behavior, it is still rational because it maximizes
discounted payoﬀs. As discussed above, we refer to this kind of behavior as rule foi.
Assume a scenario (fr,fr,foi). The opportunistic player may have an incentive to
assure that the norm-guided countries have a positive payoﬀ in the long run. Basic













The critical contribution is positive if β < 1/2 holds true (see the dotted line in ﬁgure
1). In case of 1/2 < β < β∗∗ imitation is not beneﬁcial in this proﬁle. Inserting coi into





(3b + 3β − 3bβ − 1)
≥ c
oi
Similar considerations hold true for the case of (fr,foi,foi). In general, it is never
beneﬁcial for a country to be the unique norm-guided player. But the opportunistic
players can sway it to keep the norm by making some (small) contributions. Since each
opportuinistic agent will beneﬁt from the imitating behavior of the other country, it
is a coordination problem how the burden of neccessary critical contribution should
be allocated to the opportunistic players. If one opportunist reduces his contribution
unilaterally, the other opportunist has an incentive to increase his contribution in
order to assure the critical total contribution level. Hence, there will be a continuum




(3b + 3β − 3bβ − 1)
> c
oi
is somehow allocated to the two opportunistic countries. For each feasible (b,β)-
parametrization cOI ≥ 0 holds true. These results, based on some dynamic con-
siderations, show that a variety of reciprocal and opportunistic (imitating) behavior
can be justiﬁed as equilibrium proﬁles. The possible equilibrium proﬁles (except for
(fo,fo,fo)) are depicted in ﬁgure 2.
4.2 Country-speciﬁc parametrizations
We assume that the parameters βi are diﬀerent, e.g. because the countries are af-
fected by the external eﬀect in diﬀerent ways or have diﬀerent opportunity costs of
pollution reduction. Then we have speciﬁc critical values β∗
i and β∗∗




3 there is an additional equilibrium proﬁle (fr,fr,fo). Reci-



















Figure 2: Additional equilibrium regimes
countries it could be expected that there exist multiple equilibrium proﬁles with diﬀer-
ent proportions of free-riding and cooperative behavior, depending on the distribution
of βi.
A further variation concerns the magnitude of the countries, measured by their en-
vironmental impact ai. To incorporate such magnitude diﬀerences into the model
in a simple way we assume that there are two identical small and one big country:
a1 = a2 = a, a3 = 1 − 2a (without loss of generality it is assumened that the big
country has the index 3). The parameter a is then a further degree of freedom in the
analysis. It can be shown that the qualitative results of the former section are not much
aﬀected by this modiﬁcation. It turns out that for the big country it is more likely to
be an opportunist as for a small country. This is plausible because the big country has
only little beneﬁts from the contributions of small countries while the payoﬀ decreases
with each reduced unit of own emissions. On the other hand the small countries have
12large beneﬁts from the eﬀorts of the big player. Assume that both small countries
follow the reciprocity rule fr. From computation of the behavioral equilibrium payoﬀs




(1 − 2a)(b + a)
b + a − 4ba
≥ β
∗∗
which is larger than the according critical value in case of three countries of the same
size (a = 1/3). It is not surprising that the critical value β∗∗
3 negatively depends on a:
The larger the inequality between small and big countries is, the higher the marginal
returns on contribution have to be in order to motivate the big country for cooperation.











3 holds true, it is more likely to run into a complete free-rider situation,
the larger the inequality between the country sizes is. In ﬁgure 3 both critical β-values
are plotted for the case a = 1/4 (dotted lines for equally sized countries).
If the big country does not cooperate it is very likely that also the norm-guided countries
will switch to fo in the long run. This would also have a negative impact on the big
country. Hence, there may be an incentive to imitate reciprocal behavior by making
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This implies that the larger the size diﬀerence is, the lower is the critical contribution
of the opportunist (∂coi
3 /∂a > 0). But even if the big player contributes nothing, the





Even if this condition does not hold true, one small country may motivate another






























Figure 3: Critical values for β in case of a big country
These are possible explanations why small countries commit themselves to substantial
environmental policy while the big country behaves as a free rider – like it is the case
of US policy of non ratifying the Kyoto protocol (cf. Hovi/Skodvin/Andresen (2003)
for further analysis of the motives of small countries).
5 Conclusion
The analysis provides the following results:
• Norm-guided reciprocal behavior as well as opportunistic free riding can be a
part of equilibrium proﬁles and are hence justiﬁable as reasonable behavioral
patterns. This means that substantial contributions to a global environmental
policy are possible. The problem of free riding in a public good game can partially
be overcome even without supranational institutions which are able to sanction
14governments. This is in sharp contrast to classic game-theoretic analysis which
is based on pure rational behavior.
• The distribution of diﬀferent behavioral rules and hence the distribution of pol-
lution reduction eﬀorts depends on ai and βi. Cooperation is more likely if the
marginal returns on contributions βi are high.
• Large inequalities in country sizes (diﬀerent ai) make voluntary contributions
more unlikely. The parameter regions wehere big countries beneﬁt from free
riding are larger than in case of equally sized countries.
• In all cases the danger of running into a complete non-cooperative situation
(fo,fo,fo) in the long run can be ward oﬀ when the opportunistic countries
‘imitate’ reciprocal behavior by making small pollution reduction eﬀorts.
What can countries do in order to motivate other countries to behave reciprocally or at
least to imitate reciprocal behavior? First, it may be possible that the marginal return
on contribution can be increased by side-payments of the cooperative countries. This
presupposes that for the opportunistic country the side-payments overcompensate the
negative payoﬀ eﬀect of own contributions, and that the payments are smaller than
the additional beneﬁts of the norm-guided countries.
Another, more simple, possibility is to change the base rate of cooperation b. Consider
(fr,fr,fo). The critical value β∗∗ in case of identical countries (see ﬁgure 1) implies
that for aech value of β there exists a suﬃciently low value for b so that the opportunistic
player beneﬁts from switching to fr. In case of diﬀerently sized countries, instead, there
is always an interval of suﬃciently low β-values so that this mechanism unfortunately
does not work (see ﬁgure 3). A decrease in the base rate b will sway the big country
to adopt fr only in case of hgh β3-values.
If there is no possibility to motivate a country to adopt fr it is possible to increase
their ‘imitating’ contributions (if they imitate at all). The expressions coi, cOI, coi
3 show
that the imitating contributions and hence the total wealth are positively related with
b. In this case norm-guided countries would beneﬁt from increasing the base rate b.
Since in reality the values of βi are very uncertain and may also depend on private
15information about subjective values, an increase of the base rate is very risky, however,
because this also increases β∗
i ,β∗∗
i and may induce opportunism.
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